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THE TRANSFER OF NONQUALIFIED DEFFERRED 
COMPENSATION AND NONSTATUORY STOCK 
OPTIONS: The Interaction of the Assignment oflncome 
Doctrine and Internal Revenue Code § 1 041? 
By: 
Vincent R. Barrella • 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
The assignment of income doctrine is one of the oldest 
and most consistently applied of all of the common law 
doctrines. Its origins clearly demonstrate that the presence or 
absence of tax avoidance as a reason for the anticipatory 
division of income is not a controlling factor in the doctrine's 
application.' So long as the assignor is willing to surrender 
part of the "tree" (property) he can assign the "fruit" (income) 
produced from that portion of the tree. What generally can not 
be done is to assign all or a part of the fruit without transferring 
that portion of the tree which produces the fruit.2 Thus, income 
from property can readily be assigned, provided, that the 
transferor is willing to transfer to the assignee an interest in the 
property producing the income. 3 
The rules relating to the assignment of income derived 
from the rendering of services are much more restrictive. In 
that case, the "tree" producing the "fruit" is the person 
providing the services. As it is impossible for a taxpayer to 
transfer all or part of himself to another person, earned income 
can not be assigned from one taxpayer to another unless the 
1
• J.D., LL.M.(Tax), C.P.A. ; Associate Professor of Taxation, Pace 
University, New York 
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doctrine is overridden or otherwise rendered inapplicable. 
Furthermore, the fact that a taxpayer need not render any 
additional services in subsequent years (i.e., the income is fully 
earned), does not alter that result.4 There are, however, 
judicial and statutory exceptions to the application of the 
doctrine. For example, in the domestic relations arena sections 
71 (defining alimony) and 215 (allowing a deduction for 
alimony paid) effectively override the doctrine. 
Property settlements proved to be somewhat trickier in 
light of the different state law provisions regarding interests in 
property (i.e. , common law v. community property rules). One 
of the more nettlesome decisions was the Supreme Court's 
opinion in United States v. Davis.5 In 1984, Congress 
revamped the rules governing the treatment of alimony. In 
addition, it enacted section 1041 to alleviate some of the 
problems relating to property settlements. Section 1041 
reverses the result in Davis by shifting the incidence of taxation 
from the transferor of property to the transferee. 6 Critical to 
the operation of section 1041 is a transfer of property.7 In the 
case of qualified deferred compensation, Congress provided for 
income shifting through the mechanism of a "qualified 
domestic relations order," which allows for a former spouse 
(the transferee) to be characterized as an "alternative payee."8 
There is no parallel provision addressing the consequences of a 
transfer of nonqualified deferred compensation incident to a 
divorce. 
II. REV. RUL. 2002-22 
In an effort to fill that void, the Internal Revenue 
Service ("Service") issued Rev. Rul. 2002-229 wherein it set 
forth the position that section 1041 treatment should be 
extended to nonqualified deferred compensation and 
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nonstatutory stock options. 10 In the context of transfer incident 
to a divorce, the Service has effectively put nonstatutory stock 
options and nonqualified deferred compensation on par with 
statutory options and qualified deferred compensation. While 
it is anticipated that the Service's decision will more often than 
not produce favorable results, a question lingers as to whether 
the Service's position is justified from a purely technical point 
of view. For example, in the case of qualified deferred 
compensation, the seamless dovetailing with section 1041 is 
accomplished through other statutory provisions. 11 The desire 
to achieve symmetry is admirable; but will the Service's efforts 
withstand scrutiny? 
The linchpin of the Service's effort to extend section 
1041 treatment to nonstatutory stock options and nonqualified 
deferred compensation through Rev. Rul. 2002-22 is the 
characterization of the transferor's interest in both as property. 
Once the Service concluded that these interests constituted 
property, it followed that section 1041 could apply to a transfer 
of either incident to a divorce.12 Regardless of whether the 
Service should have moved away from its original position 
regarding the primacy of the assignment of income doctrine, 
the ruling provides some significant opportunities for the 
transferor spouse and places an additional burden on the 
transferee spouse. For example, a taxpayer who is entitled to a 
significant future payment for previously provided services can 
avoid the limitations applicable to the deductibility of alimony 
by structuring the payout as a transfer of his right to the 
nonqualified deferred compensation.13 
The impact of Rev. Rul. 2002-22 can be illustrated by 
the following. Assume that at the time of their divorce, H has a 
vested interest in an unfunded and unsecured nonqualified 
deferred compensation account. Assume further that under the 
terms of their 2002 divorce decree W is entitled to receive fifty 
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(50) percent of the balance in said account and that in the event 
that W should die prior to the date of payment of the deferred 
compensation, said amount is to be paid to her estate. In 2006, 
W receives $200,000 which represents her share of the balance 
in H's deferred compensation account at the time of their 
divorce. 
Prior to the issuance of Rev. Rul. 2002-22, H would 
have recognized $400,000 of income from deferred 
compensation in 2006, but would have retained only $200,000 
since W would have received one-half of the $400,000. H 
would not be entitled to an alimony deduction pursuant to 
section 215, because the payment to W would not meet the 
section 71 definition of alimony. 14 Absent characterization as 
alimony, the payment would be in the nature of a property 
settlement. Neither H nor W would recognize any gain on the 
transfer of the $200,000. 15 If we assume that H is taxed at the 
rate of thirty (30) percent on his receipt of the $400,000, the 
applicable tax liability would be $120,000 leaving him with 
only $80,000 (or approximately 29% of the after tax payment) 
while W ends up with $200,000 (or approximately 71% of the 
after tax payment). 16 
If under the terms of the divorce decree, the payment 
would not have survived W's death, and none of the other 
limitations on the characterization of the payment as alimony 
were applicable, 17 H may still suffer adverse consequences. 
For example, if H resides in a state that imposes a tax on gross 
income he would not derive any benefit from the alimony 
deduction. Consequently, he would be subject to tax on the 
full $400,000. If W resided in the same state, she would be 
taxed on the $200,000 of alimony she received. Thus, 
$400,000 would be taxed as the state level as though it were 
$600,000. Rev. Rul. 2002-22 remedies this situation since 
under the Service's analysis only the net amount of $200,000 
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would be included in H's gross income, with the remaining 
$200,000 includible directly in W's gross income. 
In its ruling, the Service concludes that section 1041 
can override the assignment of income doctrine. There is 
nothing remarkable or controversial about this position. The 
problem is that in order for section 1041 to be applicable there 
must be a transfer of property or rights to property.18 The 
difficulty with the Service's analysis is that what is being 
transferred is the right to receive earned income (i.e. , income 
relating to services provided by the taxpayer). It remains to be 
seen whether the courts will agree with the Service that this 
constitutes a property right within the purview of section 1041. 
Compounding this problem is the fact that Congress, by 
providing for the inclusion of alimony by the recipient and its 
deduction by the payor, has provided a mechanism to shift 
earned income between taxpayers. 
III. THE DIFFERING TREATMENT OF NON-VESTED v. 
VESTED RIGHTS 
The Service specifically provided circumstances under 
which the ruling would not be applicable. One of these 
situations is where, at the time of the transfer, the transferor's 
rights are unvested or subject to substantial contingencies. 19 
The Service's refusal to extend the treatment it is willing to 
accord vested nonqualified deferred compensation or 
nonqualified stock options to similar but non-vested situations 
raises additional questions. 
The impact of the Service's refusal can be illustrated 
utilizing the facts set forth above, with one additional fact; that 
H's right to the deferred compensation did not vest unless he 
remained an employee of the plan sponsor for a period of four 
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years following the year in which the deferred compensation 
was otherwise earned. Under this circumstance, the Service 
would refuse to apply Rev. Rul. 2002-22 and would instead 
apply assignment of income principles thus taxing H on the 
receipt of the entire payment. H would suffer the adverse 
consequences set forth above, which the Service willing 
eliminated in the case of vested nonqualified deferred 
compensation. The Service never explained why this 
restrictive approach does not frustrate the purpose of section 
1041. The Service also did not offer any reason for its decision 
to restrict the scope of its ruling in this manner, for example, 
what potential abuse did it envision occurring? Instead it relied 
on the Ninth Circuit's opinion m Kochansky v. 
Commissioner. 20 
Kochansky is, however, inapposite. At issue in that 
case was an attempt by an attorney to transfer to his former 
spouse one-half of a net contingency fee from a specific case 
that was yet to be resolved. Subsequent to their divorce he 
settled the case, and the fee was paid to him and his former 
wife consistent with the terms of the divorce decree. The 
application of section 1041 was not at issue in Kochansky. 
The Service's argument, and the Court's analysis, proceeded 
entirely along assignment of income lines.21 
The Service's restncttve position is seemingly 
predicated upon its view that a contingent right does not give 
rise to property. Query whether this is inconsistent with the 
Congressional mandate to construe that term property broadly 
when applying section 1041 so as to facilitate transfers incident 
to a divorce? Insight into the Service's thought process can 
be obtained by examining the exclusion of "other future 
income rights" from section 1041 treatment. Indeed that is 
precisely the type of income interest addressed by the Ninth 
Circuit in Kochansky. A better approach would have been for 
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the Service to limit the scope of the ruling to deferred 
compensation and stock options; while at the same time 
making it clear that "other future income rights," whether 
vested or non-vested, are outside of the scope of section 1041 
where those rights relate to earned income. 22 
Within the context of a divorce there is little practical 
difference between the a division of a taxpayer's vested right to 
receive deferred compensation and a right that will vest 
provided the taxpayer continues to be employed by the same 
employer for a period of time. Applying the assignment of 
income doctrine in either situation would frustrate the purpose 
of section 1041. This is especially true given the level of 
specificity that the courts have demanded before shifting the 
c: 23 burden from the transferor of property to the trans1eree. Rev. 
Rul. 2002-22 notwithstanding, it appears unlikely that a court 
will impose the additional burden on the transferee absent a 
clear language in the divorce decree that the imposition of this 
burden was intended by the parties. 
In the case of nonstatutory options, this intent can be 
easily established through the actual transfer of said options. 
Assuming that the options can be transferred, the absence of an 
actual transfer should generally preclude the application of 
Rev. Rul. 2002-22. With respect to deferred compensation 
arrangements, to the extent that a taxpayer can assign or 
transfer his or her rights to said compensation, he or she should 
be required to do so before being able to apply the rationale of 
the ruling. Thus, the employer should be making payments 
directly to the transferee former spouse. The more difficult 
situation arises where the plan provides that the taxpayer's 
interest in the deferred compensation can not be transferred or 
assigned. In that case, payments are made to the employee 
who then makes a payment to his former spouse. In order for 
transferor to reap the benefit of shifting the tax burden to the 
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transferee, the divorce decree should contain language clearly 
delineating that the parties intended this result. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Service's willingness to permit divorcing spouses 
to shift earned income outside the parameters of a traditional 
alimony deduction provides taxpayers and their advisors with a 
significantly enhanced degree of flexibility. In order to take 
advantage of this flexibility it is imperative that the rights and 
obligations of the parties be clearly set forth. A court 
confronted with determining whether Rev. Rul. 2002-22 should 
be applied to shift the incidence of taxation from the transferor 
spouse to the transferee spouse should not be left to guess as to 
the party's intent. This is particularly important since it is 
unclear whether the result reached under Rev. Rul. 2002-22 is 
the correct one. 
ENDNOTES 
1 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). The assignment of income at 
issue in Earl arose as a consequence of an agreement entered into 
years before the enactment of the income tax in 1913. Thus, there 
was no question that tax avoidance motive was not a motivating 
factor in the income splitting arrangement. 
2 An exception to this general rule is found in Blair v. 
Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937). Blair involved a situation 
wherein the transferor did have any interest in the underlying 
property producing the income (i.e, his interest was solely that of an 
income beneficiary). The taxpayer assigned a portion of his right to 
receive income to a third party. Holding that he transferred a 
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portion of everything he had, the Court allowed the transfer and 
refused to apply the assignment of income doctrine. 
3 See,Helveringv.Horst, 311 U.S.112(1940). Thetransferorneed 
not transfer his entire interest in property to another in order to 
effectuate an assignment of income; however, that which he transfers 
must include an ownership interest in the property itself as opposed 
to simply the income to be produced from the property. 
4 See, e.g., Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940), reh. denied, 
312 U.S. 713 (1941), wherein the taxpayer sought to assign the 
income from insurance renewal commissions. These commissions 
required no further activity by the taxpayer. Despite this, the 
renewal commissions did not lose their status as earned income, so 
as to allow them to be characterized as property, or fit within the 
more liberal approach of Blair. See, note 2, supra. 
5 370 U.S. 65 (1962), reh. denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962). The Davis 
opinion complicated matters concerning property settlements by 
imposing an additional cost upon the transferor spouse in the form of 
a tax liability based upon the appreciation in the assets transferred in 
exchange for the transferee spouse's marital rights. This additional 
cost, however, was generally a burden only in common law states, 
since the joint ownership interest in community property states 
eliminated much ofthe problem. 
6 Section 1041 accomplishes this by treating the transfer as a gift 
and by providing that the transferee takes a carryover (the 
transferor's basis) in the property. See, § 1041 (b) 
7 Also essential to any analysis is a determination of the nature of 
the interest transferred in connection with the divorce. That is, was 
an interest in property subject to gain or loss transferred, or was the 
property being transferred simply the proceeds from the subsequent 
sale of the property? See, text accompanying note 23, infra. The 
answer to this question is vitally important in determining the 
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appropriate tax consequences of a property transfer governed by 
section 1041. 
8 See,-Section 414(p) 
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2004-60, 2004-24 I.R.B. 1051, which addresses the question of the 
appropriate treatment for employment tax purposes of a transfer 
within the purview of Rev. Rul. 2002-22. 
10 This represented a reversal of the Service 's previous position, that 
the assignment of income doctrine controlled the outcome in this 
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found in FSA 200005006, 2/4/2000 (involving nonstatutory stock 
options) and PLR 9340032, 7/06/1993 (involving nonqualified 
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II "' uee, note 8, supra. 
12 Congress intended that in applying section 1041, the term 
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with transfers in connection with a divorce. Balding v. 
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 368, 371 (1992); see, also, H.R. Rep. No. 
432, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. 1491, 1492 (1984) 
13 Under Rev. Rul. 2002-22, the deferred compensation which is 
assigned to his former spouse never comes into his income; 
therefore, sections 71 and 215 relating to the characterization and 
deductibility of alimony are inapplicable. 
14 The fact that theW's right to receive the applicable percentage of 
H's deferred compensation survives her death would preclude the 
treatment ofthe payment of said sum as alimony. See, §71(b). 
15 This would be true even ifH received property from his employer 
instead of cash. The property would be included in his gross income 
at its fair market value and he would take as his basis in said 
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W upon the transfer of the property, and W would take H's basis in 
the property. Thus, if W were to immediately sell the property for its 
fair market value, W would not recognize any gain or loss. 
16 The adverse tax effect could be exacerbated if any of the 
limitations based upon gross income or adjusted gross income where 
triggered. See, e.g. § 165(h)(2) relating to the limitation on the 
deductibility of a casualty loss. In addition, H would be liable for 
any applicable FICA tax applicable to the $400,000 payment. 
17 See, e.g., §71(b) and §71(f) 
18 See, §104l(b) 
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rights, or other future income rights to the extent such options or 
rights are unvested at the time of transfer or to the extent that the 
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20 92 F.3d 957 (91h Cir. 1996) 
21 Based upon the manner in which the case was argued, had the 
matter giving rise to the fee been resolved and the taxpayer been 
entitled to receive a specific sum certain at the time of the divorce, it 
is unlikely that the Service or the Ninth Circuit would have reached a 
different result. However, had the taxpayer argued section 1041 and 
if the Service is correct, that vested future right to receive income 
from services gives rise to property, within the meaning of section 
1041, then a division of a fee similar to the one at issue in Kochansky 
should be respected. 
22 The Service cited a number of pre-section 1041 cases in support 
of principle that transfers between divorcing spouses were not 
voluntary assignments so as to trigger the application of the 
assignment of income doctrine. These cases -- Meisner v. United 
States, 133 F.3d 654 (8 Cir. 1998) (transfer of a royalty interest); 
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overall claim assigned to the taxpayer's former spouse. Moreover, 
the assignment of the interest in the lawsuit was part of an overall 
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former spouse. 
23 See, e.g., Balding v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 368 (1992) (wife was 
not required to include in her income payments received from former 
husband in lieu of her share of his military retirement pay); Witcher 
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-292 (wife had to include portion 
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a state court award); Yankwich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-
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obligation to the transferee); Weir v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 
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military pension in light of clear language in the agreement); Suhr v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2001-28 (court ordered award of one-half 
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spouse on gain from sale of house; transferee did not acquire a 
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